Introduction
The following case commentary relates to the judgment of the Court of Justice held on 19.7.2016 in Case C-526/14 Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, EU:C:2016:5701 and its importance in the field of EU law on State aid. In particular, this paper explores the importance of Tadej Kotnik for a very specific and the relatively controversial area of the law on State aid, that is the temporary rules on State aid established in response to the economic and financial crisis. This commentary presents the underlying issues that led to the preliminary reference in Tadej Kotnik, the preliminary reference itself2, the subsequent Opinion of Advocate General Wahl3, the judgment at issue, and later developments in the acquis.
2013 Banking Communication
The relevant background of Tadej Kotnik is the framework of temporary rules on State aid established in response to the economic and financial crisis4. The current centrepiece of that framework, considered in the decision proper, is the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1.8.2013, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis5, also known as the Banking Communication. The Banking Communication has been issued as a soft-law act under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU by the Commission. It adopts a 'normalising' approach to granting crisis aid in that it attempts to restrict and control grants of crisis aid. It has been therein admitted that the previous crisis rules were quite agreeable with unrestricted granting of aid (at para. 18 et seq., para. 24), especially given that is was understood before (pre-financial crisis, that is) that Article 107(3)(b) TFEU had had to be interpreted restrictively, a notion the Commission then largely abandoned during the crisis6. The Communication endeavours to raise the minimum requirements for creditor burden-sharing in such a way that granting any kind of restructuring aid is to be a last resort to consider, should all capital generating measures, including the conversion of junior debt, be exhausted. Thus, Member States will have to ensure, before granting restructuring aid to a bank, that shareholders and junior capital holders of that bank arranged for the required contribution or established the necessary legal framework for obtaining such contributions. However, this is subject to the caveat that fundamental rights would be respected and financial stability would not be put at risk. Additionally, the Communication reflects the idea that the greater extent of burden-sharing implies a reduced need for measures addressing competition distortions, with the proviso that such measures to limit those distortions of competition would have to be calibrated in such a way so as to approximate, as much as possible, the market situation which would have materialised if the beneficiary of the aid had exited the market without aid. Moreover, the 2013 Banking Communication refers to the avoidance or alleviation of capital shortfalls (Kapitallücke, niedobory kapitału) as its primary goal. A "capital shortfall" is to be understood as a capital shortfall established in a capital exercise, stress-test, asset quality review or an equivalent exercise at Union, euro area or national level, where applicable confirmed by the competent supervisory authority (at para. 28). If there is (or would be) an identifiable capital shortfall in regard to a credit institution7, a Member State is to draw up a capital raising plan, determining the extent of capital shortfall of a bank that needs to be covered with State aid. After the identification, a Member State needs to prepare a restructuring plan in order to safeguard the compatibility of aid with the single internal market. The Communication further provides that all capital raising measures that can be implemented should be carried out. It therefore appears that Member States are invited to do whatever is necessary to avert a large shortfall, with the Communication providing a nonexhaustive list of capital-raising measures8. However, capital measures that will not have been implemented within six months from the submission of the capital raising plan are to be assessed by the Commission as to their inclusion, in consultation with the supervisory authority. Apart from capital measures, it may be required of Member States to effect burden-sharing in regard to hybrid shareholders and creditors holding subordinated debt. As it can be seen at paras 40-46, the Commission refers to the economic approach to equity and debt (incorporating risk and return from an investment), as opposed to the legal understanding of it. Furthermore, it follows that the brunt of burden-sharing is to be borne by those who hold the most risky interest in a given credit institution upwards, i.e. ordinary shareholders, followed by hybrid shareholders, to subordinated debt holders. Those interested parties would have to withstand, as to the 'contribution', either a conversion of their debt to equity or a write-down of the principal, in order to stop any cash flows to the extent legally possible. On the other hand, senior debt holders ("in particular from insured deposits, uninsured deposits, bonds and all other senior debt") are never expected to contribute. By way of an exception, the 2013 Banking Communication envisages that aid might be granted where implementing capital-raising measures would . The latter defines 'credit institution' as an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account. In addition, the Communication mutatis mutandis covers insurance companies (para. 26).
8 These include (a) rights issues; (b) voluntary conversion of subordinated debt instruments into equity on the basis of a risk-related incentive; (c) liability management exercises which should in principle be 100% capital generating if the capital shortfall cannot be overcome in full and therefore State aid is required; (d) capital-generating sales of assets and portfolios; (e) securitisation of portfolios in order to generate capital from non-core activities; (f) earnings retention; (g) other measures reducing capital needs.
endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results (para. 45 
Preliminary reference
The referring court put seven questions to the Court of Justice, the first of which related to the legal nature of the Communication. 
Advocate general's opinion
Upon his review of the case at issue, AG Nils Wahl rendered his Opinion on 18.2.2016. The AG took the view that the Banking Communication, as a "soft-law" act, may never bind Member States and therefore is limited to restricting discretion of the Commission. The AG therefore concluded that the premise of the order for reference, in that the Banking Communication may at least de facto bind Member States, is incorrect10, and, as such, "any effect of those rules upon Member States can at most be incidental or indirect. Even after the publication of such a communication, Member States remain at liberty to notify the Commission of aid measures which they consider compatible, even without meeting the conditions set out in that communication". Using this finding as a point of departure, the AG found that, provided that the 2013 Banking Communication is not binding on Member States, the Commission did not exceed its competence having in mind its discretion under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. The AG also suggested to the Court that the Communication is not capable of infringing the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, and that it pursues the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial system while avoiding excessive public spending and minimising distortions of competition constitute overriding public interests. The latter issue, in the AG's view, allows the Commission to not introduce any transition periods in the Banking Communication. Furthermore, according to the Advocate General, while the right to property might be affected by burden-sharing measures, the Banking Communication constitutes neither a permission to expropriate nor a licence to infringe any fundamental rights, in particular because the Communication refers to principles of market approximation and 'no creditor worse off11. There is, according to the AG, a distinction between the Communication itself, and aid measures undertaken by a Member State on its basis; the latter would have to be scrutinised by national courts. The AG emphasised the fact that there is no right to receive aid under EU law because it is the policy choice of Member States; Member States have other means at their disposal than granting aid -where they do grant aid, the Commission is to review it, but not to substitute itself for Member States12. Additionally, the AG found no issue as to Directives 2012/30/EU and 2001/24/EC. Finally, the analysis of AG Wahl has led to a finding that -as regards to parties that hold rights flowing from hybrid capital and subordinated debt instruments -conversion or writing-down of hybrid capital and subordinated debt instruments is not a sine qua non requirement for the grant of aid under the Banking Communication, and it is "not required when it would lead to disproportionate results13". In sum, the AG essentially invited the Court to decide that the Banking Communication is not binding on Member States and that it is in line with existing EU law. It is indeed true that a genuine soft-law act may not normally, in and of itself, bind Member States; its principal legal effects amount to an aid in interpretation, in particular where it casts light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement EU law or where it is designed to supplement binding provisions of EU law14. It may not be interpreted in a manner contrary to the binding EU law it supplements15. It is also true that, in the field of State aid, the Commission's discretion is limited by a soft- law act it issues and that the Commission is bound thereby the extent that such rules do not depart from the rules in the TFEU, including, in particular, Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, and to the extent that their application is not in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment, in particular where exceptional circumstances, other than those envisaged in those guidelines, distinguish a given sector of the economy of a Member State16. However, the AG failed to admit that, at least in the field of State aid, there can be soft-law rules that are genuinely binding on Member States, to the extent where Member States agree to their introduction17. This "type" of soft-law is primarily known to occur in the field of State aid and for the purposes of periodic review under Article 108(1) TFEU18. In addition, its binding legal effects in regard to Member States themselves are settled case-law, well-known before the AG gave his Opinion19. In the case of the Banking Communication, it may be conceded that it is not expressly based on Article 108(1) TFEU, but, formally speaking, solely on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Nevertheless, the Communication was indeed adopted as a response to the changing situation on the market over which the Commission keeps its review. It is also apparent from the discussion in Tadej transposed the Banking Communication into its national law, which led the referring Court to issue that order (and national claimants to bring constitutional complaints in the first place)20. In addition, there already are some dicta under what is now Article 107(3) TFEU to the effect that it is the Commission primarily, but not exclusively, who is bound by guidelines it issues21, where Member States accept such guidelines22. Therefore, it can be at least argued that the Member State at issue accepted this particular soft-law act into its legal system by way of transposition. By virtue of that, the Banking Communication could have been capable of having certain binding effects vis-à-vis that Member State either under CIRFS and IJsselVliet case-law, under a possible elaboration of what the Court implied in para. 69 of C-409/00 Spain/Commission, or possibly all of them at once, a possibility the AG did not explore. Instead, the AG opted for a formalistic approach, merely stating that the Communication is incapable of being binding, even de facto, either on Slovenia or on Member States in general, by virtue of being a soft-law act. The AG did so without scrutinising either the general effect of accepting guidelines into national law, or the actual effect of that particular transposition in the case at issue. The AG also failed to address the possibility of the Banking Communication to be an irregular act that is actually aimed at producing legal effects, despite 20 Cf. Tadej Kotnik, para. 29: "It is stated in the order for reference that the objective of the provisions of the law on the banking sector was to transpose the Banking Communication into national law, in order to enable the national authorities to grant to undertakings in that sector State aid that was compatible with the internal market. Consequently, according to the referring court, while the objections of the applicants in the main proceedings are directed against those provisions, their actual target is the Banking Communication". allegedly being soft-law. It is common knowledge that it is not the name of the act, but its contents that determine its nature23. It was not in dispute that 'burden-sharing' measures, in this form, are a novel feature under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU despite the fact that the notion of a contribution of an aid beneficiary might not be new24. Requiring non-beneficiaries to contribute in order to improve the situation of a beneficiary might be a rather novel interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU taken together with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, all the more where the Commission has no binding power to authoritatively interpret the notion of State aid25 and has no selfstanding legislative powers. 24 Cf. para. 55 of the Opinion. It is telling that the AG refers to case-law on firms in difficulty; while it is not controversial that a recipient of restructuring aid (the aid beneficiary) should make a genuine contribution to the firm in difficulty, 'burdensharing' measures do not refer to an aid beneficiary (the financial institution), but to shareholders and subordinated creditors. While shareholders may sometimes be considered a component of the undertaking that is an aid beneficiary (where they involve themselves in management of the entity that receives aid, cf. the Commission to deem aid compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU26. It should be noted that the Court did say that condition was laid down by the Commission (and hence, not expressly provided for under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU). Having said that, the Court moved on to the referred questions. It confirmed that in the exercise of its "wide discretion, the exercise of which involves complex economic and social assessments" under Article 107(3) TFEU, the Commission may adopt guidelines in order to establish the criteria on the basis of which it proposes to assess the compatibility, with the internal market, of aid measures envisaged by the Member States. According to the Court, in adopting such guidelines and announcing by publishing them that they will apply to the cases to which they relate, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of that discretion and cannot, as a general rule, depart from those guidelines, at the risk of being found to be in breach of general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations27. On the other hand, the Court stressed that the Commission may not waive the exercise of its discretion; The adoption of a communication such as the Banking Communication does not, according to the Court, relieve the Commission of its obligation to examine the specific exceptional circumstances relied on by a Member State, in a particular case, for the purpose of requesting the direct application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, and to provide reasons for its refusal to grant such a request28. Applying those principles to the case at issue, the Court held that, on the one hand, the effect of the Banking Communication shows itself in limiting discretion of the Commission; in principle, where its requirements are satisfied, the Commission may not refuse, "as a general rule", to authorize proposed State aid. On the other, Member States remain free to apply for authorization under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, applied on its own, "and the Commission may authorize such proposed aid in exceptional 26 Para. 33 of the Judgment: "(…) this case concerns the compatibility, with a number of provisions of EU law, of the condition laid down by the Commission [emphasis added] that there must be burden-sharing by shareholders and subordinated creditors, if it is to be able to find, under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, that the State aid granted in the banking sector is compatible with the internal market. The validity of such a condition must be capable of being reviewed by the Court in the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU, and that is precisely the subject-matter of the second, third, fourth and fifth questions referred". 27 Para. 38, 39 and 40 of the Judgment. 28 Para. 41 of the Judgment.
Judgment in Tadej Kotnik
circumstances". The Court further added that "the Banking Communication is not capable of imposing independent obligations on the Member States, but does no more than establish conditions, designed to ensure that State aid granted to the banks in the context of the financial crisis is compatible with the internal market, which the Commission must take into account in the exercise of the wide discretion that it enjoys under Article 107(3) (b) TFEU", holding in sum that the Communication is not binding on the Member States29. However, this reasoning implicitly confirms that the Communication is capable of imposing obligations that are dependent on some other source(s) of EU law, given that the Court did not say that it is, simply put, incapable of imposing obligations in general. This approach resembles the one taken in regard to directives being 'made effective' by general principles of law of the Union (and vice versa), as seen e.g. in aid which improves the financial situation of the recipient undertaking but is not necessary for the attainment of the objectives specified in Article 107(3) TFEU cannot be considered to be compatible with the internal market32. Building on that, the Court arrived at a conclusion that the Communication complies with Articles 107-109 TFEU, and that the Commission was entitled to consider that "burden-sharing measures were essential in order that State aid in the banking sector should be limited to the minimum necessary and that any distortions of competition in the internal market should be limited33". That conclusion is justified, according to the Court, by the need to 'prevent recourse to State aid as a tool to overcome financial difficulties of the banks concerned', the likelihood of such measures to limit the amount of State aid granted, and the need to counteract moral hazard34. In the author's view, paragraph 57 of the case at issue constitutes a further obstacle to permitting aid directly under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, as it undermines the Court's own statement under para. 43 that Member States "retain the right" to notify aid not compliant with the Banking Communication. If such an aid is to be, as a general rule, not compatible with EU law, then the "right" to notify such aid is, as a general rule, rendered meaningless, at least outside a wanton need to receive a negative Article 108 ( shareholders and subordinated creditors were not required to participate in bearing the brunt of the financial crisis at first does not constitute precise, unconditional and consistent assurances, originating from authorised, reliable sources. Even if there were such assurances, they could not justify, according to the Court, any transitional period for the Communication, due to the fact that "an overriding public interest may preclude transitional measures from being adopted in respect of situations which arose before the new rules came into force but which are still subject to change35". For the AG and the Court, the objective of ensuring the stability of the financial system while avoiding excessive public spending and minimising distortions of competition constitutes an overriding public interest of that kind. As to the right to property, the Court has, in essence, confirmed the AG's view that the right to property is not infringed by the Banking Communication. However, the Court made no express distinction between the Banking Communication itself and aid measures that involve burden-sharing. Where the AG admitted that burden-sharing measures are capable of severely affecting shareholders' and creditors' rights to property "if adopted against the will of the shareholders and creditors of banks to be recapitalised", and surmised that national courts would have to check those measures in casu, the Court of Justice flatly stated that it "cannot reasonably be maintained that the burden-sharing measures, such as those laid down by the Banking Communication, constitute interference in the right to property of the shareholders and the subordinated creditors". The reason for that, according to the Court, is that write-down or write-off of value merely adjusts the shares or the debt at issue to their economic value36. This approach ignores the possible severity of involuntary burden-sharing 36 Cf. paragraphs 75 and 79 of the Judgment. The Court did say that, in the case of subordinated creditors, their contribution is a last resort ("(…) those creditors are to contribute to reducing the capital shortfall (i) only after losses are first absorbed by equity and (ii) only 'if there are no other possibilities' available to overcome any capital shortfall in the bank concerned or where that bank no longer meets the minimum regulatory capital requirements") and that the 'no creditor worse off' principle should be complied with. However, "no less in economic terms" than what the creditors could have received in insolvency proceedings is always an exercise in probability; in addition, where such an exercise is mandatory, it extinguishes any possibility of trading the right and the fact that a possibility of mandatory measure may limit the value of their shares or claims. The Court's reasoning is therefore less nuanced that that of the AG. Further on, the Court considered the issues related to the fifth question on Directive 2012/30/EU, the sixth question on proportionality and the seventh question on Directive 2001/24/EC and its reorganisation measures. The Court largely followed the AG on all those matters. As to the fifth question, the Court confirmed that its judgment in Pafitis37 is not relevant to the facts of the case and may not be read as precluding burden-sharing measures where they would be decided without the approval of the company general meeting; neither is Directive 2012/30/ EU, held to not constitute an obstacle to the Banking Communication38. The sixth question grappled with burden-sharing measures in regard to the writing down of subordinated rights, the issue being whether those rights must always be written down in accordance with paragraph 44 of the Banking Communication39. The Court confirmed that compliance with paragraph 44 is sufficient for aid to be approved, but disagreed on its mandatory character, stating that a Member State may choose not to require a write-down of subordinated rights, but in doing so, risks any aid granted in such a manner being deemed incompatible with the internal market. The Court of Justice added that no write-down of such rights is required where this would be disproportionate, i.e. not necessary to overcome the capital shortfall of the bank concerned40. The seventh and last question was also swiftly dealt with, with the Court stating that 'burden-sharing' measures do constitute reorganisation measures within the meaning of Directive 2001/24/EC, where they are not voluntary41. However, in so doing, the Court of Justice contradicted itself -it did admit that at issue (e.g. through factoring), leaving those affected with more limited options, and hence, worse off. the burden-sharing measures, in particular the conversion of the principal of subordinated rights into equity or the write-down of the principal, are, by their very nature, likely adversely to affect the pre-existing rights of third parties and, accordingly, to lead to a reduction of creditors' claims42
It is not readily apparent why the Court would not admit that where it scrutinised, for instance, the right to property, but could do so elsewhere in the same decision43. In sum, the Court found that the Communication is not binding, that it neither infringes Articles 107-109 TFEU nor does it breach the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and the right to property, that burden-sharing measures in regard to subordinated debt are not mandatory but their absence creates a risk for Member States under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU (and they must be proportional), and that Directives referred to in the order are legally irrelevant for validity of the Banking Communication.
Later developments in the acquis and conclusions
The decision in Tadej Kotnik was subsequently referred to by the Court in Dowling, on the point that extraordinary reorganisation measures in regard to a public limited liability company need not be approved by the general meeting44. Tadej Kotnik was also recalled on occasion by the General Court45. More generally, absence of measures of the kind envisaged in Tadej Kotnik was noted in Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1208 of 23.12.2015 on State aid granted by Italy to the bank Tercas, where inter alia lack of burden-sharing on the part of subordinated debt holders was indicated for prompting recovery of aid46. To conclude, it may be said that Tadej Kotnik's importance lies in affirming the validity of the 2013 Banking Communication47, notwithstanding several issues with the decision itself. Tadej Kotnik, along with the Communication, serve as a stepping stone towards "normalising" Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. For now, however, the Commission is left with a considerable degree of norm-generating authority under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, and the levels of stringency envisaged in e.g. C-301/96 Germany/Commission have not returned.
